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The authors of this article are members of a task force on Robust and Reliable Science
created by the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology (SIOP). The task force
was charged with evaluating the state of research practices in the field of industrial and organizational (I-O) psychology and with providing recommendations to SIOP’s Executive Board
for areas where targeted improvements could be directed. Summary material from this article
was presented in a report to the Executive Board prior to SIOP’s annual conference in April
2017. The intention of this focal article, which went through the journal peer review process,
is to summarize the initial outcomes generated by the task force and elicit commentary from a
wider range of stakeholders to critique, discuss, and expand upon these positions. The information and input received from these commentaries will be incorporated into a subsequent
final report delivered to SIOP’s Executive Board in February 2018. Our hope is that the collective discussion of these topics and the development and endorsement of a set of principles
by our community will serve as a basis for future decisions and initiatives within SIOP and
our broader profession that facilitate an even stronger and more robust science within I-O
psychology.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to James A. Grand, Department of Psychology, University of Maryland, 3147A Biology-Psychology Building, 4094 Campus Drive, College Park, MD, 20742. E-mail: grandjam@umd.edu
4
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 24.160.101.102, on 24 Apr 2020 at 16:00:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/iop.2017.55

f o s t e r i n g r o bu s t i - o p syc h o l o g y s c i e n c e

5

Credibility and trustworthiness are the bedrock upon which any science is built. The
strength of these foundations has been increasingly questioned across the sciences
as instances of research misconduct and mounting concerns over the prevalence of
detrimental research practices have been identified. Consequently, the purpose of
this article is to encourage our scientific community to positively and proactively engage in efforts that foster a healthy and robust industrial and organizational (I-O)
psychology. We begin by advancing six defining principles that we believe reflect the
values of robust science and offer criteria for evaluating proposed efforts to change
scientific practices. Recognizing that the contemporary scientific enterprise is a complex and diverse network of actors and institutions, we then conclude by identifying
12 stakeholders who play important roles in achieving a culture of robust science in
I-O psychology and offer recommendations for actions we can take as members of
these groups to strengthen our science.
Keywords: robust science, open science, reproducibility, scientific ecosystem, research integrity

The level of trust that has characterized science and its relationship with society has contributed
to a period of unparalleled scientific productivity. But this trust will endure only if the scientific
community devotes itself to exemplifying and transmitting the values associated with ethical
scientific conduct. (Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, & National Academy
of Engineering, 1995, p. v)

Industrial and organizational (I-O) psychology finds itself facing an uncomfortable dilemma. The field continues to witness tremendous growth
in membership (e.g., SIOP Membership Committee, 2017); opportunities
for I-O–related careers that improve societies, organizations, and workers’
lives in meaningful ways have never been greater (e.g., Boutelle, 2014);
and the evolution of theory, research, and methodologies in our field reflects a maturing and increasingly sophisticated science (Kozlowski, Chen,
& Salas, 2017). Alongside these promising and laudable achievements, however, questions and anxieties about our research practices and the broader
system in which our science exists have also continued to grow (Banks,
O’Boyle, et al., 2016; Banks, Rogelberg, Woznyj, Landis, & Rupp, 2016; Bedeian, Taylor, & Miller, 2010; Bosco, Aguinis, Field, Pierce, & Dalton, 2016;
Byington & Felps, 2017; Franco, Malhotra, & Simonovits, 2014; Hambrick,
2007; Honig, Lampel, Siegel, & Drnevich, 2014; Kepes & McDaniel, 2013;
O’Boyle, Banks, & Gonzalez-Mule, 2017; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonshon,
2011). The message expressed is a consistent and unpleasant one: If left
unchecked, issues with how our scientific enterprise functions could pose
significant threats to the credibility of our science and to the evidence-based
practices it supports.
We believe it is important to be in front of any such gathering storm
(though it could be argued that this storm has already gathered) that could
undermine the credibility of our discipline and hold significant consequences for both our academic and practitioner members. In light of these
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issues, the purpose of this focal article is to stimulate an open dialogue within
our community about how to promote and sustain a healthy and credible
science in I-O psychology. We initiate this conversation by offering a vision,
well-aligned with similar calls made from other sources, for what we believe
defines and characterizes a robust science. It is our hope that the commentaries received from our community will help shape this vision into an agreed
upon set of core beliefs that are endorsed by our professional membership
and reinforced by their actions. The second goal of this article is to facilitate discussion of the positive scientific behaviors that should be taken to
achieve these aspirational criteria. Recognizing that our scientific enterprise
is an interconnected network of stakeholders, systems, and institutions, we
approach this topic by describing key players in our scientific ecosystem and
opportunities these entities have for facilitating robust science. It is our hope
that input on this topic identifies responsibilities, points of leverage, and—
most importantly—actionable steps that can be pursued using available resources within our profession. Striving to ensure I-O psychology operates
and is perceived as a robust and credible science is important, community
driven, and communicates that we are committed to the generation of trustworthy scientific knowledge and services that benefit society. Before delving
into these discussions, we first provide context on the current state of affairs
on scientific integrity and the impetus for engaging our community in matters related to robust science.
Research Integrity, I-O Psychology, and the Modern Scientific Landscape

In a recent comprehensive review and report on the integrity of science at
large, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2017)
described three types of activity that jeopardize the credibility of scientific
knowledge: research misconduct, detrimental research practices, and other
misconduct. The report notes that both research misconduct (fabrication,
falsification, or plagiarism during any aspect of the research process) and
other forms of misconduct (e.g., gross negligence of professional activities or
regulations, inappropriate use of funds, whistleblower retaliation, tampering
with or sabotaging experiments/equipment) tend to be relatively rare occurrences. When such incidents are uncovered, however, they carry significant
consequences for the offenders, generate a large amount of negative publicity for their specific disciplines, and contribute to the general erosion of
societal trust in science (Jha, 2012; Pew Research Center, 2015). In contrast,
detrimental research practices1 are less readily visible, though purportedly
1

Detrimental research practices are also commonly referred to as questionable research practices (QRPs) in the I-O psychology and management literatures. We have elected to use the
term detrimental research practices as this is the current phrasing adopted and advanced by
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more common, and include activities such as selectively reporting hypotheses, HARKing (hypothesizing after results known), and “flexible” or misleading manipulations of statistics and data, among others (see Banks, O’Boyle,
et al., 2016; Simmons et al., 2011). Although detrimental research practices
and their outcomes are typically less extreme and immediately felt than are
acts of misconduct, they are often difficult to observe or to recognize for what
they are and thus represent a subversive and insidious threat to the products
of science (National Academies of Science, Engineering, & Medicine, 2017).
Despite evidence that detrimental research practices (e.g., Banks,
O’Boyle, et al., 2016; Bedein et al., 2010) and acts of misconduct (e.g., Atwater, Mumford, Schriesheim, & Yammarino, 2014) occur in I-O psychology and related sentiments that the trustworthiness of our evidentiary base
may be questionable (Bosco et al., 2016; Kepes & McDaniel, 2013; McDaniel,
Kepes, Hartman, & List, 2017), there is also evidence that our science is
healthy on a number of fronts and that we do many things right. For example, meta-analytic research shows greater correspondence between paired
lab and field study effects among I-O psychology studies than other areas of
psychology (r = .89, 95% CI [.83, .93]; Mitchell, 2012). As another longstanding example, the economic benefits of using sound selection procedures have
been repeatedly documented (e.g., Schmidt, Hunter, Outerbridge, & Trattner, 1986). The relatively close connection between science and practice,
openness to both experimental and field methodological approaches, and
the study of topics that are inherently multidisciplinary likely all contribute
to promoting the health of our science. Furthermore, matters of research
integrity are not unique to I-O psychology, the management sciences, the
social sciences, or even the physical sciences. Virtually every discipline of science grapples with these issues and the implications they hold (e.g., Fanelli,
2009, 2011; Ioannidis, 2005a; Marcus, 2014; Rubin, 2011). Although the calls
to action are seemingly louder today, robust science concerns are not unique
to the modern era and have been part of the narrative for decades (e.g., National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, & Institute
of Medicine, 1992; Newcombe, 1987; Rosenthal, 1979).
Considering the above, why should I-O psychologists beat the drum
about research integrity at this particular moment? At the most general level,
the health of a science requires diligence and continued effort to maintain
and improve; thus, we should never be content with letting this drum beat
stop. Beyond such existential motivations, though, we believe there are at
least two specific reasons why it is important our field engage in this issue
more directly at this point in time. First, emerging trends in the environthe National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2017) and more directly
conveys the belief that such practices are harmful to the scientific enterprise.
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ment in which research occurs have made it necessary to reevaluate existing
methods for safeguarding scientific rigor. The scientific enterprise is now
larger and more complex than ever before. According to the National Science Board (2016), the number of individuals enrolled in graduate science
programs increased by 19% (7% increase in psychology), and the number of
doctoral degrees awarded in the sciences by 43% (2% increase in psychology) between 2000 and 2013. Even more astounding, the number of scientific articles published in 2003 (∼1.17 million) nearly doubled by 2013 (∼2.2
million; from 19,291 to 37,194 in psychology; National Science Board, 2016).
Coupled with this growth, the use of new technologies for gathering and processing data, the globalization and collaborative nature of modern research,
and the increasing need for scientific knowledge to inform public policy
and decisions have contributed to an industry that is dynamic, fast paced,
and high impact (National Academies of Science, Engineering, & Medicine,
2017). Although these developments reflect exciting growth in the capabilities of scientists and practitioners for advancing research and applications in
important and unanticipated directions, they also contribute to certain undesirable consequences. For example, more rapid knowledge creation and
dissemination diminish the capacity for existing structures/practices to selfcorrect faulty or scientifically unsound information (e.g., debunking empirical evidence generated using detrimental research practices; Hollenbeck &
Wright, 2017). Similarly, pressures to remain competitive and visible in this
system contribute to patterns of reinforcement that place significant emphasis on where—as opposed to what—research is published as indicators of research quality (e.g., as evidenced by proliferation of journal ranking lists for
tenure and promotion and the provision of monetary bonuses for publishing
in particular journals used in some universities). Such norms engender circumstances in which researchers may feel compelled to do what is needed
to “win the publication game” that make the scientific enterprise ripe for
dysfunction. In sum, many of the mechanisms we have traditionally relied
on for monitoring, regulating, and correcting the accumulation of scientific
knowledge are beginning to show their limitations in the new scientific reality and underscore the need to reexamine key systems that protect its interests (Casadevall & Fang, 2012; Nosek, Spies, & Motyl, 2012).
Second, and more germane to our own discipline, I-O psychology is
uniquely suited to be a leader in the movement toward fostering a robust
and reliable science (e.g., Banks & O’Boyle, 2013). Many of our scholarly topics of interest (e.g., motivation, organizational justice, organizational change,
leadership) and practice applications (e.g., performance evaluation, change
management, training and development) offer insights and important tools
that can be helpful for reshaping the scientific enterprise in positive ways.
In fact, the relevance of the work performed by I-O psychologists for both
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identifying and understanding factors that contribute to research misconduct and to detrimental research practices as well as for developing solutions
to these issues was cited on numerous occasions in the National Academies
2017 report on research integrity. There is thus a great opportunity not only
to benefit our own discipline by pursuing proactive means that contribute to
research integrity but also to demonstrate the value of our unique knowledge
and expertise to the scientific community and society more broadly.
In order to meaningfully contribute to the dialogue on encouraging, facilitating, and rewarding research integrity, it is important to first identify
what a healthy science looks like. We thus now turn our attention toward
defining the characteristics of robust science.
Defining Principles for Robust Science

Historical reviews tracing the development of the contemporary research enterprise in the United States note that the roots of scientific industry began
as an “informal, intimate, and paternalistic endeavor” in which research was
considered more a hobby or a novelty than as a purpose-driven career (National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, & Institute of
Medicine, 1992, p. 67). As the economic value of science and ideals supporting the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake became more widely agreed
upon throughout the 20th century, research as a profession emerged as a viable calling. These developments spurred rapid growth in a variety of institutional and societal systems to support the advancement of science, including publically supported funding agencies for research, a larger publication
industry devoted to disseminating scientific work, and more explicit incentive structures to reward the production of scientific knowledge. At its core,
however, the scientific profession continued—and largely still continues—
to operate in ways consistent with its decentralized, autonomous, and idiosyncratic heritage. For example, there are no commonly endorsed criteria
for evaluating research quality or contribution (Nosek & Bar-Anan, 2012),
and formalized professional development in science education has generally
been eschewed in favor of informal apprenticeships and mentor-based models. The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2017)
summarize this state of affairs:
Even today, being a scientist and engaging in research does not necessarily entail a career with
characteristics traditionally associated with professions such as law, medicine, architecture,
some subfields of engineering, and accounting. For example, working as a researcher does not
involve state certification of the practitioner’s expertise as a requirement to practice, nor does
it generally involve direct relationships with fee-paying clients. […] One challenge facing the
research enterprise is that informal, ad hoc approaches to scientific professionalism do not ensure that the core values and guiding norms of science are adequately inculcated and sustained.
(p. 22)
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Efforts to establish explicit and widely held standards for how the research process should be conducted or evaluated, how it should be communicated in graduate student training, and how its supporting institutions
should be coordinated are thus bound by the cultural milieu of the scientific profession. To be clear, we do not wish to imply that I-O psychology,
the management sciences, or science as a whole need make any radical departures from this system; we believe the intellectual freedom and diversity
of thought/opinion it permits are critical drivers of scientific progress. Nor
do we wish to imply that our community lacks values and norms concerning
scientific integrity or that we fail to transmit and reinforce these expectations
in our research, practice, and mentoring. However, recognizing the unique
nature of our scientific environment provides insight into the sociocultural
challenges (regardless of the logistical difficulties) faced by efforts to reinforce and foster a robust science system. Notably, it highlights the need to
engage in what Luscher and Lewis (2008) describe as “working through paradox.” That is, in an effort to drive positive changes in our science, it is desirable both to retain the flexibility afforded by our research culture and to better manage our ways of doing to foster and ensure robust scientific practices.
We believe a useful point of departure for this discussion is to identify
an agreed upon set of principles that reflect how our field defines robust science. The purpose of such principles should be to make explicit the values
that reflect “better science” (Grote, 2016); operationalize the meaning of robust science; and provide helpful guidelines for identifying, evaluating, and
allocating resources (e.g., time, effort, money) toward any proposed changes
intended to improve scientific practices (cf., Nosek & Bar-Anan, 2012; Nosek
et al., 2015). We do not advocate that any such principles be treated as a
checklist of requirements or be used as a basis for judging any individual
study or researcher. Further, we do not claim that the principles we list here
are or need be novel (e.g., Antonakis, 2017). Instead, we see importance in
explicating such foundational principles that serve as markers to orient behaviors and decisions in ways that contribute to robust science across the
entire scientific enterprise. To this end, we offer the following defining principles for consideration.
1. Robust Science Is Relevant

There is general agreement among economists and public policy experts
that investment in basic and applied research is a significant contributor
to and distinguisher of socioeconomic health and success across the global
landscape (cf., Fagerberg, 1994). Although difficult to directly quantify the
manner by which science leads to such improvements, the fundamental
premise is simple: The knowledge, understanding, and expertise generated
through the pursuit of science allow scholars and practitioners to address
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complex problems that benefit our lives in ways big and small (Pavitt, 1996).
For example, the science of I-O psychology involves generating knowledge
and descriptions of the psychological experiences and social interactions
that unfold within and between individuals and the organizations in which
they work. The accuracy and usefulness of the knowledge generated by a
discipline broadly characterizes its relevance—the degree to which science
and practice improve understanding of the world, address important needs
and problems of our time, and/or contribute to outcomes that benefit humanity and society (Allen, 2015). Certainly not every scientific endeavor will
(nor should) result in an immediately cohesive explanation, applicable technological advancement, policy reform, or cultural improvement. However,
when these are the goals that spur science, both the producers and recipients
of scientific knowledge are more likely to benefit. Consistent with these sentiments, we propose that a robust science is one in which activities throughout
the entire scientific enterprise are conducted with the intention of producing
positively impactful and relevant knowledge.
2. Robust Science Is Rigorous

The rigor of a science is reflected in the extent to which its core concepts
and their relations are operationalized with precision, and the methodologies used to collect informative observations are accurate and appropriately
aligned with the analytical techniques used to infer meaning from those observations. The technologies and methodological/analytical toolboxes available to I-O psychologists for accomplishing these tasks in both research and
practice are more extensive and richer than ever before. Furthermore, there
is growing appreciation of the unique insights that a wider breadth of approaches can bring to understanding the phenomena that we study (i.e., triangulating on a phenomenon from multiple perspectives, compensating for
weaknesses among particular methodologies; Cortina, Aguinis, & DeShon,
2017). More methodological freedom, of course, also places a greater onus on
the producers, reviewers, and users of scientific knowledge to be informed of
the strengths and inevitable weaknesses that choices among different philosophical (e.g., induction, deduction, abduction), methodological (e.g., selfreport, behavioral, physiological), and analytical (e.g., quantitative, qualitative) perspectives hold for advancing scientific understanding. We therefore
advance that a robust science is characterized by choices that favor rigor over
expedience and values leveraging diverse investigative tools that align with
the research questions being examined.
3. Robust Science Is Replicated

Recent discussions and headlines on the replicability/reproducibility crisis within science (Baker, 2016) and the psychological sciences in
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particular (e.g., Carey, 2015; Yong, 2016) have raised many concerns and
anxieties. Large-scale initiatives that have attempted to gather evidence on
the replicability of research findings across a variety of topics have presented
many sobering statistics on the extent to which the results of published research are reproducible (Ioannidis, 2005b; Klein et al., 2014; Open Science
Collaboration, 2015). These results have stimulated heated arguments about
the validity of such metascience efforts and the conclusions they imply (see
Anderson et al., 2016; Gilbert, King, Pettigrew, & Wilson, 2016). However,
similar to the inadequacy of only using p-values and statistical significance
tests to determine whether scientific knowledge is “supported” versus “not
supported” (Cohen, 1990; Schmidt, 1996; Simmons et al., 2011), efforts to
determine the replicability of findings can be similarly flawed when solely directed toward establishing a (false) dichotomy between scientific knowledge
that “replicates” versus “fails to replicate” and debating the arbitrary criteria
used to justify that distinction.2 The more critical significance of replication
efforts is that they facilitate the collection of large bodies of evidence upon
which scientific knowledge is based and refined. Consequently, we propose
that a robust science is not one that seeks to establish the replicability of its
findings per se but instead is one that values and pursues efforts to gather
repeated (i.e., replicated) observations of the mechanisms and relationships
among core concepts and processes of human behavior, and that these efforts
are made accessible in the corpus of scientific evidence. Such practices are
critical in order to establish the degree of confidence that should be placed
in scientific claims and to support evidence-based practice.
4. Robust Science Is Accumulative and Cumulative

Despite the staggering number of scientific works published every year (National Science Board, 2016), many have maligned that much of this growth
reflects that science is “fattening up” rather than “growing up.” That is, there
is concern that the emphasis on exciting but untested theory that posits discontinuous change in current thinking is contributing to scientific bloat,
whereas efforts to test and build upon existing explanations in ways that
gradually refine current thinking languish in obscurity (e.g., Antonakis,
2017; Colquitt & Zapata-Phelan, 2007; Hambrick, 2007; McKinley, 2010).
There is clearly a delicate and difficult balance to strike between promoting
scientific pursuits in ways that foster incremental progress (e.g., reliance on
widely used and tightly controlled paradigms) and encouraging “disruptive”
thinking that challenges the status quo with new ideas (Nosek et al., 2012;
2

Here we are reminded of Rosnow and Rosenthal’s (1989) discussion on science’s adherence
to p < .05 as the declaration for establishing scientific knowledge: “Surely, God loves the .06
nearly as much as the .05” (p. 1277).
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Pfeffer, 1993). Indeed, it is difficult to envision how a field can remain impactful and credible when it favors one end of this continuum too strongly
over the other. Science benefits when both incremental research and novel
idea generation occur. Consequently, new ideas and ways of thinking should
not be deterred, but we must also recognize that the strength of scientific
understanding and inference is enhanced through careful vetting, deliberate calibration, and compounding multiple observations into an integrative
whole. We thus propose that a robust science is one in which the pursuit of
cumulative knowledge is reinforced by adopting an appropriate degree of intellectual skepticism toward novel propositions and appropriately adjusting
those beliefs on the basis of accumulated evidence.
5. Robust Science Is Transparent and Open

Although we all contribute to and participate in multiple aspects of the
broader scientific enterprise, a surprising amount of the system remains
opaque. For example, authors are often the only ones who know whether
time and effort was devoted to examining data supportive of their hypotheses, whereas less supportive data were relegated to the “file drawer” (Rosenthal, 1979). Editors and reviewers only evaluate a summary of the methodological and analytical decisions made in a research study rather than the
full original source materials (Nosek et al., 2012). End consumers of research typically never see nor have access to the exchanges, disagreements,
and revisions that occur during the review process that ultimately shape a
manuscript (Nosek & Bar-Anan, 2012). Practitioners or researchers at institutions with limited resources often lack access to research disseminated in
scientific journals because of high publisher subscription costs (Houghton &
Oppenheim, 2010). As a result of such gatekeeping actions, very few (if any)
individuals in a scientific community ever have full knowledge of “how the
scientific sausage gets made.”
Many of the norms that guide the dissemination and communication of
research products throughout the scientific enterprise emerged and persist
for reasons that are valued, logical, and well-intentioned. Nevertheless, human history has taught us that increasing access to knowledge can be transformative on a grand scale, and organizational research has taught us that
knowledge about the distributive, procedural, and interactional decisions
made in a system is empowering and tends to promote positive behavior
(Greenberg & Colquitt, 2005). As such, we consider a robust science one
in which transparency and openness are embraced throughout the research
process and scientific system. Activities that embrace these principles include more complete disclosure of data, materials, analyses, and hypotheses
to the scientific community; promoting publication practices in which important questions answered well have a place in the literature regardless of
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results; and creating accessibility to the research process at all stages of production. We recognize there are challenges with data transparency and openness from corporate and private settings (e.g., Gabriel & Wessel, 2013; Jones
& Dages, 2013). However, we wish to challenge I-O psychologists working
in these settings to push for what can be shared with appropriate protections
in place. Too often we fear the default is to not even engage in conversations
about data sharing with clients or with I-O psychologists working internally.
Ultimately, a robust science is one in which transparency across the scientific
enterprise is the professional expectation and at the very least strived for in
all that we do.
6. Robust Science Is Theory Oriented

In a manuscript discussing the limitations of quantum theory as the foundation for physics, Albert Einstein noted, “The whole of science is nothing
more than a refinement of everyday thinking” (1936, p. 349). In this, Einstein
reflects the notion that a critical goal of science is to take observations from
our environment and transform them into accurate and useful explanations
(i.e., theories) of how and why phenomena in the natural world occur (see
also Feynman, 1969). The development of accurate, useful, and evidencebased explanations is a distinguishing feature of all sciences. Consistent with
many recent discussions on the role of theory in the organizational sciences
(e.g., Antonakis, 2017; Campbell & Wilmot, in press; Colquitt & ZapataPhelan, 2007; Hambrick, 2007; McKinley, 2010; Ones, Kaiser, ChamorroPremuzic, & Svensson, 2017; Spector, Rogelberg, Ryan, Schmitt, & Zedeck,
2014), we advance that a robust science entails treating theory as a means
to an end, not an end in and of itself. That is, theory for theory’s sake is
not rewarded, and resistances against or devaluing of applied, inductive, and
exploratory research are removed. Instead, a robust science is simply one
in which its scientific pursuits contribute to explanation and “refinement of
everyday thinking” by replicating, bounding, revising, falsifying, and, when
appropriate, advancing new claims. By this definition, we propose that robust science is “theory oriented” (not theory driven or theory dependent)
and promotes this tenet by describing, evaluating, and refining explanations.
Genuinely accomplishing this goal requires research that reflects quantitative and qualitative methodologies across the full range of inductive, deductive, and abductive approaches.
An important addendum to this principle is the recognition that theory
in robust science is not an informed hunch, logical speculation, or collection
of plausible relations—it is “a comprehensive explanation of some aspect of
nature that is supported by a vast body of evidence” (National Academies
of Sciences & Institute of Medicine, 2008, p. 11). Consequently, a theoryoriented robust science is one in which explanations and empirical research
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emphasize precision. As a general definition, scientific precision reflects the
degree to which explanatory mechanisms are specified with sufficient detail
such that predictions/explanations regarding the specific magnitude, form,
processes, and conditions that account for a set of relations can be advanced
and tested (Edwards & Berry, 2010; Kozlowski, Chao, Grand, Braun, &
Kuljanin, 2013). Note this definition does not require every aspect of a theory to be correct to be precise. The rightness of a theory is not determined
by the clarity of its arguments or through formal logic3 but by subjecting its
claims to the gauntlet of empirical investigation. A science that strives for
precise theories purposefully subjects its explanations to an increased “risk”
of falsification to determine the level of confidence that should be placed in
proposed relationships (Meehl, 1967). These higher evidentiary standards
are commonplace in more well-developed areas of science, such as physics
and chemistry, but are still lacking in the social sciences (Fanelli, 2010a). We
thus submit that a theory-oriented robust science is one in which its explanatory accounts strive for the highest degrees of precision.
In sum, the culture of the modern scientific enterprise in which I-O psychology resides presents unique challenges for enacting changes that foster
healthy and credible science. However, we believe that making progress toward these ideals can be facilitated through establishing common ground
among members of our scientific community about the meaning of robust
science and its foundational aspirations. To this end, we advanced six defining principles of a robust science (summarized in Table 1); specifically, a robust science is (a) relevant, (b) rigorous, (c) replicated, (d) accumulative and
cumulative, (e) transparent and open, and (f) theory oriented. Endorsing a
shared vision of robust science represents a commitment to promoting and
reinforcing activities that emphasize positive scientific behaviors. More important though, it can also serve as a means for guiding and coordinating
collective action that incrementally contribute to these changes. It is to this
point that we now turn our attention.
I-O Psychology’s Scientific Ecosystem and Recommendations for Action

The scientific enterprise is a complex, interconnected ecosystem of
stakeholders, processes, and functions (National Academies of Sciences,
3

In his Opus Majus, the 13th-century English philosopher and early proponent of the modern
scientific method Roger Bacon described four general causes of human ignorance: (1) subjection to unworthy authority (i.e., reliance on false experts), (2) the influence of habit (reliance on personal ideals and customs), (3) popular prejudice (reliance on popular opinion
and “conventional wisdom”), and (4) false conceit of our own wisdom (reliance on rational
argument in lieu of evidentiary facts). Of these, Bacon emphasized the final cause as the
most dangerous and pernicious source of ignorance, as it is typically supplemented by the
previous three causes and therefore the most difficult to counteract (cf., Bridges, 1897).
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Table 1. Summary of the Defining Principles of Robust Science
Robust
science is …
Relevant

Rigorous

Replicated

Accumulative
and
cumulative
Transparent
and open
Theory
oriented

Description
Generation and application of research is intended to improve
understanding of the natural world, address contemporary needs
and issues, and/or contribute to beneficial societal outcomes.
Theoretical and empirical activities emphasize careful
operationalization of core concepts and use of diverse
methodological/analytical approaches to explore research
questions.
Collection of multiple and repeated observations of primary
relationships are pursued and recognized as critical to establishing
confidence in scientific claims and evidence-based practice.
Cumulative knowledge and efforts to establish confidence in the
strength of scientific understanding are pursued in a manner that
balances generation and incremental vetting of new ideas.
Activities related to conducting, reporting, and disseminating
research are undertaken in ways that facilitate understanding of the
processes involved and products created during research.
Outputs of all scientific research contribute to the development of
increasingly accurate, useful, evidence-based, and precise
explanations for natural phenomena observed in the world.

Engineering, & Medicine, 2017). We assert that creating and sustaining a
robust science will require a scientific ecosystem whose members reflect five
core intentions:
1. Recognition that science is a public good and thus should be readily
available for the benefit of everyone
2. Provision of incentives and reward structures that value the publication
of a full range of evidence (i.e., null results, replications, etc.) based on
well-formulated research, regardless of the findings
3. Developing and embracing research output platforms that move outside
the traditional scientific communication system
4. Engaging all stakeholder groups in adherence to the defining principles
of robust science
5. Reinforcing the defining principles of robust science at all stages of the
research process
Many different actions could be undertaken to satisfy these goals in
I-O psychology, and models for their implementation can be gleaned from
other disciplines. However, successful efforts at promoting robust science
made in other fields may not necessarily translate across different scientific
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Figure 1. Scientific ecosystem responsible for fostering robust science.

disciplines, given variability in norms and practices (e.g., Evans & Reimer,
2009). This highlights two important needs for adapting the scientific
ecosystem within I-O psychology. First, there is a need to understand the
various stakeholders and contributors within our contemporary scientific
enterprise so that the roles these entities play in promoting and sustaining a healthy science are better understood. Figure 1 provides a graphical
heuristic of the most significant members we consider in this ecosystem.
The stakeholders in this visualization are organized around two concentric
rings reflecting the extent to which we believe the unique roles played by
these entities are more (innermost circle) versus less (outermost circle) capable of directly influencing robust scientific practices, as well as the extent
to which our scientific community has more (innermost) versus less (outermost) direct control over their norms, procedures, and operations. As any
single individual may contribute to multiple of these stakeholder groups concurrently, it is useful to identify the different actions one could carry out to
promote robust science when wearing any of these hats. Second, the only way
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in which the goals of a well-functioning scientific ecosystem can be achieved
is through participation and action at all levels of the system. We believe
small, meaningful changes that take place simultaneously and in a coordinated fashion across multiple members of our scientific enterprise can lead
to self-reinforcing behaviors that gradually improve the field. As such, our
goal for the remainder of this article is to identify the significant contributors
to the scientific norms and practices within I-O psychology and recommend
proactive changes that these entities can make to facilitate robust science. We
fully recognize that our list of stakeholder elements is not exhaustive. It is
not hard to identify other entities of relevance (e.g., organizational decision
makers, universities). We chose the ones we did because we believe the field
would be united around the central importance of each. Table 2 provides a
summary of these recommendations.
Authors

Authors are the primary generators and communicators of the research
products in a scientific field. As the first point of contact with the collection, creation, and interpretation of inductively driven ideas and deductively
guided empirical data, authors give voice to the explanations that are advanced for phenomena observed in the natural world. Consequently, authors
are arguably the most influential source of bottom-up change in the scientific
ecosystem for fostering robust science. We believe that the core responsibilities authors hold for fostering a robust science can be categorized into two
broad sets of activities: (a) accurately, honestly, and clearly reporting all activities used in the production of scientific research; and (b) prioritizing publication practices that embody the defining principles of robust science. These
responsibilities span many specific actions encompassing both the research
and publication processes, but below we highlight three activities perceived
as particularly critical.
First, authors should accurately describe and represent the capabilities of
their methodologies and analyses when proposing inferences from their research. Science is not—and can never be—perfect. To borrow from McGrath’s (1982) discussion of dilemmatics, research inevitably involves decisions that create tradeoffs among the precision, generalizability, and realism
of results. In our field, it is common for authors to acknowledge these choices
near the end of a manuscript when outlining the limitations of a research
study. These sections have largely become placeholders for obligatory statements such as “the research should be tested using a different sample” or “the
cross-sectional design does not allow for causal inferences,” which authors
then feel motivated to defend to lessen the blow of their choices on conclusions they wish to draw. The role of an author in a healthy scientific ecosystem is not to convince the reader of how “exceptional” their study is, nor to
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Table 2. Summary of Recommended Actions to Foster Robust Science by
Stakeholders in I-O Psychology’s Scientific Ecosystem
Stakeholder

Recommendations

Authors

• Accurately describe and represent the capabilities of methodologies
and analyses when proposing research inferences
• Be precise and transparent when describing the development of
research questions and rationale for the methodological/analytical
choices used in research
• Commit to enacting defining principles of robust science even
when not rewarded for doing so
• Establish review and reviewer norms consistent with robust science
• Provide regular and constructive feedback to reviewers
• Experiment with enacting nontraditional journal practices designed
to promote robust science
• Evaluate and, where appropriate, revise journal management
practices to ensure they are consistent with advancing the
principles of robust science
• Be open to diverse methodological approaches, research questions,
and types of evidence in manuscript evaluations
• Be more accepting of “imperfections” in research
• Promote and encourage authors to engage in practices that support
the defining principles of robust science
• Publically endorse, openly advocate for, partner with, and reward
initiatives intended to advance the defining principles of robust
science
• Provide resources for developing and implementing tools,
techniques, and systems that encourage robust scientific practices
• Place greater value on practices whose evidentiary base exhibits
characteristics of robust science
• Collaborate with academic researchers (and vice versa) to broaden
the range of settings, data sources, and interpretations present in
the scientific knowledge base
• Incorporate and emphasize the significance of the defining
principles of robust science into explicit educational objectives
• Actively demonstrate, model, and provide learners with
opportunities to engage in robust scientific practices
• Recognize and be proactive in counteracting risks associated with
the traditional publishing model that contribute to the prevalence
of detrimental research practices
• Adopt a more holistic approach to evaluating candidates that
reduces singular emphasis on “very elite” research productivity per
se and rewards engagement in practices that foster robust science

Editors

Reviewers

Professional
associations

Practitioners

Educators

Publishers

Academic
hiring and
promotion
committees
Consumers

• Place greater value on research that embodies the defining
principles of robust science
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Table 2. Continued
Stakeholder

Recommendations

Research
participants
Funders

• Recognize the importance of participation to scientific
contributions and participate in ways that reflect that status
• Institute and enforce policies that promote greater transparency,
rigor, and precision when evaluating and rewarding research
proposals
• Pursue product designs in which the “default” behavior of a tool
facilitates robust scientific practice

Scientific tool
providers

generate a list of possible flaws and then systematically rebuke them. Instead,
the author’s responsibility is to openly acknowledge the extent to which the
methods and analyses used in their research do and/or do not allow them
to draw particular conclusions. This goal should be reflected throughout
a manuscript rather than only after findings have been presented, including when hypotheses are developed (e.g., justifying hypotheses that do not
propose the form, magnitude, or conditions for an effect; Edwards & Berry,
2010), methods and analyses are described (e.g., conveying extent to which
a measure/technique permits one’s predictions to be examined, degree to
which results are robust to other plausible analytical choices; Simmons et al.,
2011), and inferences are advanced (e.g. not overgeneralizing implications
beyond the data; Hollenbeck & Wright, 2017).
Second, authors should be precise and transparent when describing the
development of research questions and the rationale for the methodological/analytical choices used in their research. Much has been written concerning the statistical and epistemological concerns of HARKing and similar detrimental research practices (Banks et al., 2016; Hitchcock & Sober,
2004; Hollenbeck & Wright, 2017; Kerr, 1998). The specifics of those arguments are beyond the scope of this discussion, but their root cause is a
lack of transparency from authors concerning conceptual rationale, methodological decisions, and analytical choices. Whether one identified a meaningful relationship after (faithfully) hypothesizing a finding a priori or it
was identified post hoc does not change the fact that the observed relationship was present in the data. The natural world could not care less
whether the scientist made an accurate prediction beforehand or not—but
the manner by which scientific inference advances does. The attributions, interpretations, and implications that authors advance about their observations should change based on the process used to generate them. When
a conceptual rationale is genuinely new, deviates from previous explanations, or is based on small sample sizes, it is important (and acceptable!) for
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authors to present interpretations from those studies with a healthy dose of
skepticism. Similarly, it is important (and again, acceptable!) to openly describe the pros and cons of the methodological or analytical decisions made
by the authors to pursue a scientific explanation. The goal of authors in a robust scientific ecosystem is to improve explanations and descriptions of how
and why things in the natural world work the way they do. The ability to
achieve this goal is significantly impaired when precision and transparency
in conceptual rationale and methodology are lacking (Simmons et al., 2011).
Last, authors should commit to enacting the defining principles of robust
science even when they are not rewarded for doing so. There are numerous
avenues through which authors can attempt to meet the values of robust
science. For example, authors can show a preference toward journals that
actively reinforce robust science principles; make a point to have colleagues
from both practice and academia collaborate and review manuscripts to engage multiple stakeholders in the research process; make materials, data,
and/or analyses openly available when feasible; and place accepted prepublication manuscripts in open-access repositories. Whatever the ways in which
these values could be fulfilled, they share the characteristic of being outside the current status quo and the route through which status and recognition are typically achieved in the current publication enterprise (Nosek
et al., 2012; Nosek & Bar-Anan, 2012). These activities feel like extra work
with little direct payoff to authors—because that is precisely what they are
at present. However, a vibrant ecosystem can only be sustained if authors
collectively agree that “what’s good for the science” is at least as important
and helps to achieve “what’s good for the researcher.” Ironically, this situation shares many of the same characteristics with classic social dilemma
and game theoretic scenarios that organizational scientists have studied for
decades (Byington & Felps, 2017). The widely replicated inference from that
line of research is that when individuals choose not to engage in socially
beneficial behaviors, everybody loses in the end. If our field is to achieve the
ideals of robust science, then all authors must contribute to the system they
wish to create.
Editors

Editors-in-chief and associate editors of scientific journals (hereafter collectively referred to as editors) represent the most significant gatekeepers of
published research in the current system of scientific communication (Nosek
& Bar-Anan, 2012). Editors possess a number of avenues for influencing the
quality and type of research published (Zedeck, 2008, 2017). Editors’ actions
at a journal are generally perceived as communicating the requirements, criteria, and beliefs about what constitutes high quality and valued research.
Furthermore, individuals also typically reach editorial positions because of
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their career successes and thus tend to be respected and widely connected
figures in the broader science network. Editors thus possess multiple bases
of power (e.g., reward, legitimate, referent, expert, and informational power;
Raven, 1992) that make them instrumental levers for stimulating change in
the scientific enterprise. We highlight a number of recommended activities
in which we believe editors in I-O psychology and the managerial sciences
should engage to foster robust science.
First, editors should establish review and reviewer norms consistent with
robust science. To have a robust science, compelling research questions answered in methodologically sound ways should be published regardless of
the actual pattern of results. We believe editors should explicitly communicate to their editorial teams and editorial boards that publication recommendations be made based on two principal factors: (a) the theoretical, conceptual, and practical relevance of the research questions explored and (b) the
rigor of the methodology/analyses used to answer those questions. Along
with this, editors should strongly communicate continuously to reviewers
the importance of being open to scientific advancement through both inductive and deductive research, and that a “perfect study” (i.e., all hypotheses
fully supported, all a priori theoretical rationale completely consistent with
observed data, etc.) is not a requirement for publication per se (Simmons
et al., 2011). After all, null findings found in statistically and methodologically powerful ways are essential to the advancement and self-correction
of science (Landis, James, Lance, Pierce, & Rogelberg, 2014). This type of
very frequent messaging facilitates alignment of the expectations and values
expressed by reviewers.
Second, and very importantly, editors should provide regular and constructive feedback to reviewers. In many ways, editors represent the chief
talent officers of their journals—they seek out reviewers they think will
provide high quality services, wrestle with strategies for balancing reviewer
workload, and are constantly looking for ways to diversify and maintain
a productive crop of reviewers. However, one activity we believe could
occur more frequently is provision of feedback and training opportunities
to reviewers to help shape and/or correct behaviors in ways that promote
robust science. For example, a reviewer who suggests dropping null results
or creating new hypotheses after results are known should be informed by
the editor of the inappropriateness of this recommendation and asked to
revise the comment and/or signal in the decision letter that this action is
inadvisable. Reviewer feedback and development by the editorial team not
only plays an important role in facilitating more productive reviews but
also signals that the practices of robust science are desirable and should be
applied when reviewers adopt authorship roles with their own independent
research. Editors must recognize their unique responsibilities in assuring
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that reviews and decision letters from their journal do not implicitly
or explicitly encourage questionable research or work counter to robust
science. If time for the above essential activities appears nearly impossible to
find, editors must work strongly, in concert with their publishers, to expand
the editorial team and/or streamline processes to recover time. A lack of
time cannot be a reason to abdicate robust science responsibilities.
Third, editors should experiment with enacting nontraditional practices
at their journal designed to promote robust science. Editors work hard to
maintain fair and balanced practices that ensure the “rules of the game”
implicitly and explicitly promote and result in dissemination of high quality research. Although the current system has been successful on a number of fronts, there are many new and emerging ideas about how these
practices might be altered to better engender behaviors that facilitate robust science. Some visions for these practices represent novel and idealistic changes that would require substantial shifts in editorial infrastructure
and journal management (e.g., Nosek & Bar-Anan, 2012). Others though
are much more moderate in scope (e.g., Nosek et al., 2015). For example, attempts by editors to introduce results-blind submission paths, explicit journal sections welcoming replications, and options for authors to preregister
studies are relatively straightforward, and good models for these practices
are emerging. Journal editors could encourage authors to host their data,
materials, measures, additional analyses, previous manuscript versions, review letters, and other materials in accessible and online repositories (such
as the Open Science Framework, http://osf.io) to promote increased transparency and accumulation of science. Additionally, editors could pursue and
reward regular reviewer training to promote an improved review process.
In essence, editors should not only strive to be a steward of their journal
but to also be a steward of science and use their unique role to experiment
with practices that can make meaningful improvements for the scientific
enterprise.
Last, editors should evaluate and, where appropriate, revise journal management practices to ensure they are consistent with advancing the principles of robust science. Beyond the many tasks that editors perform related
to promoting the rigor and quality of research published in their journals,
editors are also the captains and caretakers of a journal’s reputation while
they are at the helm (Hollenbeck, 2008). Consequently, engaging in thoughtful and diligent reflection on editorial leadership practices reflects an important piece of the puzzle. For example, much has been written about the
importance of impact factors and “citability” as indicators of journal quality and editorial stewardship (e.g., Byington & Felps, 2017; Ireland, 2008).
Although impact factors convey useful heuristic information about journal quality, narrowly focusing on them can encourage “gaming” behaviors
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(e.g., coercive citations) and discourage experimentation with interventions
that may be good for robust science but potentially poor for impact factors.
Embracing a multifaceted perspective on journal quality that extends beyond impact factors to characteristics such as engagement in open science,
humanity in the review process, responsiveness, timeliness, and stakeholder
satisfaction should also be considered. In addition to managerial practices
focused inwardly on one’s own journal, editors also play a key role as a
liaison with publishers and other journal editors within and outside our
specific discipline. Advocating for publication models that provide greater
access to science and engaging in cooperative cross-journal initiatives that
collectively promote positive scientific behaviors should be normative editorial behaviors.4
Reviewers

There is widespread belief that the peer review process is one of the oldest
and most venerable characteristics of science. Although critical dialogues
and the defense of ideas among scholars have certainly existed since the earliest of scientific philosophers, the peer review process as we know it today did
not exist until the mid-to-late 20th century (coinciding with the commercial
availability of photocopiers and the ability to easily print multiple copies of a
paper; Spier, 2002). Reliance on voluntary peer reviews of scientific research
is now a staple of the contemporary scientific enterprise. Although editors
still make the final determination on whether to publish a given research
product, reviewers have become an increasingly significant quality assurance and gatekeeping mechanism of a field’s research. We thus propose three
recommended actions from reviewers within the field for promoting robust
scientific practice.
First, reviewers should be open to diverse methodological approaches, research questions, and types of evidence in their evaluations. When evaluating manuscripts submitted for publication, importance/rationale of the research questions along with methodological rigor should continue to drive
the recommendations made to editors regarding suitability. As noted previously, the rigor of a research study or theoretical proposition is characterized
by precise operationalization, the extent to which the methodologies used
permit collection of valid/informative observations, and the use of transparent and justifiable analytical strategies for generating inferences. There
are clearly multiple ways in which these goals can be achieved. As such, the
goal of reviewers is to evaluate the research product before them and not
4

With over 200 signatories, the grassroots initiative to establish a Code of Ethical Conduct
(https://editorethics.uncc.edu) among editors in the field of I-O psychology and management highlights one successful example of a large cross-journal collaboration designed to
promote better science.
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the research they would have preferred to see. On occasion, this may require
reviewers to learn about unfamiliar methodological (e.g., inductive, qualitative, computational) or analytic (e.g., Bayesian statistics, semantic analyses,
data mining) approaches to provide an adequate evaluation. Although such
activities demand additional time, we believe it is important that reviewers
and editors not perceive this as an unwanted burden but rather as professional development and an opportunity to learn something new (which may
prove useful in one’s own work) while simultaneously providing a service
to their field and colleagues. This does not mean that reviewers cannot or
should not be constructively critical and identify where improvement/clarity
is warranted. However, recommendations should be sensitive to the fact that
there are many different approaches through which research can be conducted and such diversity is conducive to robust science. Relatedly, reviewers
also should not display a preference for the “novelty” of an idea but should
be open to any sound study that leads us closer to understanding important
phenomena. That is, reviewers and editors should consider the study as a
whole (i.e., theory, methodology, importance of question) in terms of the
extent that it helps contribute to an understanding of the phenomenon of
interest.
Second, reviewers should be more accepting of “imperfections” in research.
Imperfect research exists because it is the only kind of research there is (McGrath, 1982). Everyone who has conducted research knows there will always
be instances where different decisions could have been made that might have
altered the pattern of observed results and inferences drawn from a study.
However, the expectation that every or even most data patterns should work
as predicted (or be predicted a priori) is unreasonable, unrealistic, and likely
contributes to the prevalence of many of the detrimental practices that take
place in our research (Simmons et al., 2011). Results that fail to achieve statistical significance and hypotheses that are unsupported do not necessarily
signal bad research. In fact, the occurrence of a null finding may be an important data point on the road to discovering truth. Such data should not be
censured from our knowledge base if the observation is based on sound scientific practices. A review process that is more open to these “imperfections”
promotes an accumulative science that allows for more accurate and precise
explanations/predictions to be achieved. At the same time, it decreases the
overall incentive for authors to implicitly or explicitly engage in detrimental research practices and submit papers that have been overly sanitized and
cleaned.
Last, reviewers should promote and encourage authors to engage in practices that support the defining principles of robust science. Like editors, reviewers have significant opportunity for communicating positive norms about robust scientific practices. Whereas reviewer commentary should be directed
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toward evaluating the relevance and rigor of research, reviewers can also
hold authors accountable for participating in open science by encouraging
engagement in transparent reporting and sharing practices wherever possible during the review process. Additionally, papers that include or could
include replications of previous findings and therefore contribute to cumulative knowledge should be positively recognized and drawn to the attention
of editors. In short, reviewers should see themselves as empowered change
agents that can help move us toward a more robust science. The reviewing
process can serve as a leverage point to incentivize robust scientific behaviors
and enhance the soundness of our scientific findings.
Professional Associations

There are typically multiple professional associations within any given scientific community. Some are small and regional; others are large and international. Some exist primarily to host conferences, and others provide certification, publishing, advocacy, and research support services. Irrespective
of their differences though, all professional associations share the feature of
promoting a common identity and network for members of a scientific community. As a result, professional associations provide a number of unique
resources and opportunities for advancing initiatives to support robust scientific practices.
First, professional associations should publically endorse, openly advocate for, partner with, and reward initiatives intended to advance the defining principles of robust science. Whereas scientific journals and the publication review process implicitly communicate normative expectations about
robust science, professional associations have the opportunity to communicate these values more directly and broadly. This activity should be seen
as a core function of any scientific professional association, as it underlies
the credibility of the field, the credibility of the academy, and the credibility
of practice. Both the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology
(SIOP; http://www.siop.org/mission.aspx) and the Academy of Management
(AOM; http://aom.org/About-AOM/Vision,-Mission,-Objectives—Values.
aspx), the two largest professional associations in our field, provide direct
statements about the values, mission, and objectives held by their associations. We believe these mission statements could be updated to include
declarative commitments to explicitly foster robust science. To be sure, both
of these groups have engaged in some limited activities toward these ends.
For example, in 2008 SIOP leadership entered into an Alliance for Organizational Psychology (AOP) with Division 1 of the International Association
of Applied Psychology (IAAP) and the European Association of Work and
Organizational Psychology (EAWOP). Eight years later, the first AOP summit meeting was held and a memorandum of understanding was established
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that identified several potential problems that may undermine the rigor,
ethics, and relevance of our scientific enterprise and offered potential solutions for addressing these issues (Grote, 2016). Although it is still too early to
know what outcomes and initiatives may arise from these and other similar
actions, momentum and commitment to achieving the goals of robust science can be improved through direct endorsements, declarations, and advocacy by professional associations. In other words, we need our key professional associations to make robust science a top priority that is strongly
addressed year in and year out.
Second, professional associations should provide resources for developing
and implementing tools, techniques, and systems that encourage robust scientific practices. Openly supporting the values that foster robust science is an
important step to promoting a healthy culture of science. However, change
will only happen with boots on the ground. Professional associations can
make a difference by dedicating time and monetary resources to members
for instituting change. For example, the task force on Robust and Reliable
Science (to which the authors on this article belong) requested and received
financial support from both the SIOP Executive Board and Scientific Affairs
Committee to back its efforts. In collaboration with the Executive Board
and the SIOP Administrative Office, the 2017 SIOP Program Committee
was able to create a new submission track and infrastructure allowing SIOP
conference attendees to share data, analysis code, and papers presented at a
session or poster with other members (see also http://www.siop.org/rr/). The
allocation of resources to robust science activities creates accountability on
the part of advocates (i.e., members) and supporters (i.e., professional associations) for making positive changes. We believe there are many additional
initiatives where the commitment of resources by professional associations
would be beneficial, such as (a) efforts to develop competency models,
education, and certificates of training for reviewers; (b) repositories for
training and/or standardized applications for using open-source statistical
programs that promote analytical transparency; (c) introductory training
and incentives for engaging in open science practices (e.g., through Center
for Open Science, https://cos.io/); (d) using conferences and workshops as
platforms for teaching open science elements to members; (e) developing
and managing online indexed open-access journals/reports that can become
locations for replication research; and (f) providing small grants and seed
money for initiatives designed to promote robust science (e.g., “study
swap” and other similar initiatives that encourage data sharing/partnerships
between academics and practitioners, creation of a “measures chest” or
similar repository for sharing materials to facilitate replications). We
recognize that the success and implementation of any such activities will
be conditioned on the determined actions of individual members and
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collaborations within a scientific discipline. However, these bottom-up
changes can be greatly accelerated when support and resources are provided
by institutions and professional associations that align with and value these
goals.
Practitioners

I-O psychology is based on a scientist–practitioner model in which the
knowledge generated through science ideally informs practice, and the
front-line needs faced in practice ideally inform science. Although debates
over the extent to which our discipline has been successful at (or is even capable of) achieving this vision are common (e.g., Rupp & Beal, 2007), those
who apply the evidentiary base of organizational science to address the concerns, problems, and goals of organizations and workers represent integral
members of the scientific enterprise. Depending on their roles and activities, practitioners may assume many of the same responsibilities as authors,
reviewers, editors, consumers, and participants for fostering robust science.
In addition to the recommendations advanced for those groups, we posit
two unique actions through which practitioners can further contribute to
improving the scientific ecosystem.
First, practitioners should place greater value on practices whose evidentiary base exhibits characteristics of robust science. Just as one places greater
confidence in empirical research knowledge generated by robust scientific
practices, the application of knowledge that is supported by robust science
to create tools, services, and solutions will be more generalizable and reliable.
Practitioners who make use of the knowledge produced in I-O psychology to
address issues faced by organizations are responsible for interpreting the appropriateness of research and the evidentiary base they use to support their
practices. In some respects then, empirical and conceptual work that adheres
to the defining principles of a robust science creates a competitive advantage
for practitioners, as the degree of uncertainty around the efficacy of practices
supported by that work should be reduced. Furthermore, practitioners supporting and more actively applying knowledge that is transparent, replicated,
precise, and rigorous can also provide motivation for researchers to engage in
these practices to improve the relevance of their primary research. Displaying preference for robust science by relying on sources of well-established
understanding benefits practitioners and simultaneously helps advance the
relevance and rigor of the field’s scientific base.
Second, practitioners should collaborate with academic researchers (and
vice versa) to broaden the range of settings, data sources, and interpretations present in the scientific knowledge base. The call to bridge the science–
practice divide is not a new one (e.g., Latham, 2007; Rynes, 2007; Rynes,
Giluk, & Brown, 2007). Many of these appeals cite the importance of

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 24.160.101.102, on 24 Apr 2020 at 16:00:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/iop.2017.55

f o s t e r i n g r o bu s t i - o p syc h o l o g y s c i e n c e

29

shrinking this gap so that scientists and practitioners are aware of the latest developments/needs and to stimulate new directions for empirical study.
Perhaps more fundamentally though, partnerships between scientists in academic settings and scientist–practitioners are among the most direct and
straightforward methods available for strengthening the rigor, precision, and
relevance of our evidentiary base—an outcome that benefits both the accumulation and application of science. Through sharing measurement practices, collaborating with researchers on field studies, and making the results
of practice applications more accessible and available to the scientific community, practitioners represent a potent force for challenging the generalizability of research and theory. Academic–practitioner collaborations thus
do more than keep the cutting edge sharp; they serve as an essential barometer and foundational bedrock for determining the degree to which scientific
findings may be considered legitimately robust. Although such partnerships
are likely to face additional hurdles with respect to transparency of methods
and data due to concerns over intellectual property, confidentiality, and legal
protections, we do not see these challenges as insurmountable. Practitioners
frequently conduct research during the implementation and evaluation of
organizational programs and should thus be similarly documenting their research methodology, sample characteristics, and statistical procedures. The
steps taken to produce the results of their analyses (e.g., data exclusion criteria, scale construction, etc.) should also be documented to enable accurate
interpretation of findings and limitations due to sample conditions. Whenever possible and appropriate, efforts to share data and methods associated
with research application and extensions should be made available across
the profession. This goal is facilitated through collaboration among scientists
who work across various settings (e.g., academic or field-based practice).
Educators

Science is a continual learning process. Many in academic and practice settings facilitate this goal through the provision of both formal and informal
instruction, guidance, and mentorship. The most familiar of these educational roles is found in universities where professors provide training to both
undergraduate and graduate students on the principles of I-O psychology.
However, educational roles span a variety of contexts, including professional
development workshops, developing online tutorials, and working as project
managers. Educators and mentors across the board thus play a pivotal role
in shaping and transmitting norms for robust science through teaching and
modeling positive scientific practices. We suggest two actions in which educators should engage to promote principles of robust science.
First, educators should incorporate and emphasize the significance of
the defining principles of robust science into explicit educational objectives.
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Virtually all undergraduate and graduate education in I-O psychology and
related sciences exposes students to fundamental issues related to the scientific method, research design, validity, and research ethics. In our experiences, the primary focus of instruction on these topics is most often directed
toward discussing tradeoffs among methodological or analytical choices (in
the case of research methods) and issues surrounding the protection of research participants (in the case of research ethics). Both of these content areas are unquestionably important, relevant, and should continue to be emphasized as part of formal training. However, we believe these educational
efforts should be supplemented with instruction on the principles of robust
science and the responsibility that scientists have for ensuring such criteria
are met. For example, discussing the meaning and identification of research
misconduct and detrimental research practices, and why they should be
avoided; understanding the difference between HARKing versus alternative
forms of inference and their implications for advancing science (e.g., Hitchcock & Sober, 2004; Hollenbeck & Wright, 2017); understanding the difference between imprecise and precise theory (Edwards & Berry, 2010; Kozlowski et al., 2013); and describing the significance and means for conveying
transparency in one’s methodological and analytical choices (e.g., Simmons
et al., 2011) all reflect topic areas for which formal educational objectives
for training would foster robust science. The same is true for educational
initiatives that occur outside of student education as well (e.g., ensuring that
learners in a workshop on research methodologies or analyses understand
how to apply new techniques in ways that promote transparency, rigor, and
precision). We recognize that these topics are often discussed idiosyncratically as part of the mentorship system in science education; however, we
believe there is great benefit in more systematic and consistently delivered
educational instruction on these topics.
Second, educators should actively demonstrate, model, and provide learners with opportunities to engage in robust scientific practices. Research has
reliably demonstrated that the retention and transfer of learning is greatly
facilitated when training and education provide clear models for how to enact desired behavior and provide learners with opportunities to practice and
receive feedback on these skills (e.g., Bell & Kozlowski, 2008; Taylor, RussEft, & Chan, 2005). In other words, learning is facilitated through showing and doing, not just telling. Because a great deal of education in I-O
psychology occurs through individualized mentor–mentee or supervisor–
supervisee relationships, it is particularly important that robust scientific
practices be modeled and reinforced during collaborative work with junior
learners. Additionally, opportunities to practice behaviors conducive to robust science should be made available to learners. There are many activities
that could be used to satisfy these goals: engaging learners in the scientific
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review process (e.g., sharing reviews received and generated by the educator, “co-reviewing” a paper with the learner); exploring tools and emerging
products that facilitate open science (e.g., using open source statistical programs such as R, using repositories such as the Open Science Framework
for theses/dissertations); and promoting efforts to replicate existing research
alongside new/ongoing research all represent avenues through which educators can enact and engage learners in robust science.
Publishers

The publishing industry is experiencing a shifting economic landscape. On
the one hand, publishers reap tremendous profit from the current business
model supporting scientific publishing (Houghton & Oppenheim, 2010). On
the other hand, business models have changed dramatically in recent years
as the availability of electronic platforms continues to grow. One need only
look at the impact of online reporting outlets on the newspaper and magazine industry to find examples of the rapid demise of once prominent publications and the dissolution of business enterprises that persevered within the
traditional business model.5 The scientific publishing industry is susceptible
to similar patterns, though change has been slower. Revenue forecasts for
scientific and technical journal publishers have shown flat growth in recent
years (e.g., Ware & Mabe, 2015). Open-access vehicles are rapidly growing
yet still capture only a small portion of the overall scientific and technical
research output market (Neylon, 2013). With continued pressure on scientific publishers to compete with and adopt more open access practices, it
seems likely the economics of publishing will favor the move toward digital formats. Nevertheless, so long as the current publication model remains
advantageous to revenue generation from the sale of journal subscriptions
(primarily to research libraries supported with public funding), the current
publication model will remain steady. Consequently, we believe that publishers play a critical role in fostering robust science.
Most notably, publishers should recognize and be proactive in counteracting risks associated with the traditional publishing model that contribute to
the prevalence of detrimental research practices. In theory, publishers should
have a vested interest in the quality of the content they produce. If the status of published science erodes as a result of trends observed in the current
publishing process (e.g., HARKing, dropping null findings to craft a better
“narrative,” etc.), the value proposition offered by their most prestigious and
profitable research outlets stands to be damaged. Furthermore, to the extent
5

Recent data show that the number of newsprint outlets has continued to drop significantly
over the past 10 years, employment is down by nearly 40% over the past 20 years (roughly
the time period that reflects the increasing availability of digital outlets), and remaining
publishers are consolidating (Pew Research Center, 2016).
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that authors and consumers within the scientific enterprise value the benefits to robust science that open-access journals provide (i.e., quicker time to
print, greater data transparency, “crowd-sourced” peer reviews, more rapid
dissemination of ideas throughout the scientific community, higher citation
rates, etc.), shifts in submission rates and journal readership may change.
Some have suggested that many of the publication practices observed today stem from constraints that emerged because of production costs associated with printing paper copies of journals (e.g., Nosek & Bar-Anan, 2012).
Whatever the genesis, removing archaic page restrictions, ending restrictions on editorial team size, and providing latitude/encouragement to editors
to engage in innovative initiatives opens the door for a variety of alternative
journal publication and readership practices capable of fostering a more robust science. For example, new metrics for research quality that move beyond simple citation-based measures can be pursued. Research access models where impact is assessed by factors such as page views, the quantity and
quality of active commentary, the number of studies that replicate and extend the original work, and the value conveyed by the provision of supporting materials and original data are more easily traceable in an open-access
model and contribute to the accumulation of robust science. Increasing the
variety and transparency of research outlets and publisher practices has potential to stimulate more and better scientific advances while maintaining
the credibility of the scientific and technical publishing market. Like editors
and reviewers, publishers should strive to be stewards of science as well.

Academic Hiring and Promotion Committees

The phrase “publish or perish” is a ubiquitous and anxiety-provoking maxim
familiar to anyone within academia. Whereas the production and dissemination of scientific knowledge is a core activity of all researchers, publication numbers, citation counts, and other easily quantifiable metrics of research productivity remain the coin of the realm in higher education (De
Rond & Miller, 2005). These norms have almost certainly been driven by increased competition over declining resources in the scientific landscape and
the subsequent need to differentiate oneself and one’s academic institution
as respectable, distinguished, and desirable. Within academia, the proverbial
rubber meets the road with the publish-or-perish adage in the form of hiring
and promotion committees that determine who is hired, who is retained, and
who is permitted to rise through the ranks. Much has been written and even
limited empirical evidence exists linking the pressures to publish reinforced
through hiring and promotion committees to detrimental research practices and other undesirable outcomes (e.g., Anderson, 2007; Fanelli, 2010b;
Rawat & Meena, 2014). Hiring and promotion committees thus represent an
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obvious and important contributor for shaping the way in which the scientific enterprise operates.
We recommend that academic hiring and promotion committees should
adopt a more holistic approach to evaluating candidates that reduces singular emphasis on “very elite” research productivity per se and rewards engagement in practices that foster robust science. Advancing scientific knowledge
that is relevant, rigorous, replicable, cumulative, transparent, and theory
oriented—that is, research that adheres to the defining principles of robust
science—should be among the most important criteria for determining the
contributions of a researcher’s work. These evaluative markers can be incorporated into hiring decisions by efforts to evaluate an applicant’s record of robust scientific practices and the extent to which these individuals have taken
proactive steps toward demonstrating these principles in their contributions
to the field (i.e., engage in transparent data sharing, attempt to replicate their
findings in addition to advancing new understanding, demonstrate the capability to produce precise theoretical predictions). Likewise, promotion and
tenure decisions are often influenced by the sheer quantity of an individual’s
publications and the extent to which these products appear in “A” journals;
at the extreme, these decisions may rely very little on appraisal of the quality
of an individual’s work. At the same time, they can create a very high-stakes
publishing game where authors will perhaps do everything it takes (including engaging in detrimental research practices) to publish in the journals
that will get them their tenure and/or promotion. The achievement of robust science simply cannot be achieved through such a reward structure.
Only through valuation of the extent to which a researcher’s body of work
embraces robust science, regardless of where such work may be published,
will the scientific enterprise advance in a positive direction. We recognize
that such shifts in the evaluation of a researcher’s record places different and
significant demands upon peers and administrators to more fully understand
the nature of robust scientific contributions. However, we believe such incentives are critical and liberating to the pursuit of accurate and useful scientific
knowledge.
Consumers

How and why the scientific knowledge generated by a field is used vary
widely depending on the needs and context of different research consumers.
The insights gained through I-O psychology are used to advance future research, guide practice, and to support policies/decisions of critical importance to individuals, teams, businesses, and society. Consumers of scientific
research span a diverse range of stakeholders, including authors, reviewers,
editors, practitioners, funding agencies, organizational decision makers, and
the general public (e.g., media). Although each of these constituencies shares
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varying degrees of responsibility for ensuring that scientific research is appropriately conducted, all share responsibility for ensuring that this knowledge is properly interpreted and correctly utilized. As a source of demand
for the supply of scientific knowledge generated within our field, consumers
of research also play an important role in fostering a healthy scientific enterprise.
We believe consumers should place greater value on research that embodies the defining principles of robust science. Novel, counterintuitive, and
“catchy” theories/research findings have always sparked great interest across
the spectrum of scientific consumers (Antonakis, 2017), and likely will continue to do so. Why wouldn’t they? Many who conduct research, and likely
many more who do not, believe that the spirit of science lies in innovation, discovery, and intrepid exploration of the unknown (e.g., Astley, 1985;
Davis, 1971; Pfeffer & Fong, 2002). Weick (1989) even famously equated the
construction of theory in the managerial sciences as “disciplined” imagination. We acknowledge that these motives are central to the fabric of science
and can be beneficial forces for scientific advancement. However, when consumers within the scientific enterprise too strongly favor “creative” science to
the detriment of robust science, a positive feedback loop is created in which
the number of ideas in need of testing/verification far surpasses the capacity
to do so.6 This state of affairs places the relevance, reliability, and credibility of a field’s work at risk. Consumers of research can influence this trend
by holding science accountable for producing robust science. The ability to
distinguish robust science obviously requires understanding of the power
and limitations of research methodologies as well as how to evaluate the
degree of confidence that should be placed in research. However, the challenge in determining these criteria is attenuated when scientific evidence is
supported by behaviors characterized by rigor, transparency, and precision.
Consequently, by expressing preference toward journals and outlets that require and actively engage in robust scientific practices, consumers have potential to shape the scientific ecosystem.
Research Participants

Unlike many of the natural sciences, the foci of study for the social sciences
do not uniformly adhere to well-known and clearly distinguishable principles of behavior. People and the psychological/social systems that they create
6

Although we hesitate to draw too strong a comparison, this situation is reminiscent of
Rudolph and Repenning’s (2002) work on disaster dynamics within organizational systems.
Most notably, they demonstrate that when the rate at which events accumulate in an organization exceeds its capacity to resolve them, systems can quickly pass an unrecoverable
tipping point in which they are no longer able to meet their normal operating demands and
the likelihood of significant disasters occurring is dramatically increased.
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are diverse, rich, and exhibit a free will of choice that makes efforts to understand how they function simultaneously fascinating and perplexing. As
I-O psychologists, we rely on a variety of measurement and observational
tools that attempt to capture the “hidden” experiences of people in laboratory
and organizational contexts. The individuals who participate in our research
thus carry significant weight in determining the quality and reliability of the
evidentiary base. Although it can be difficult (and often undesirable) to directly influence the way in which research participants engage with the scientific process, they are integral elements of the scientific ecosystem whose
actions clearly contribute to key aspects of a robust science.
Accordingly, we believe that research participants should be encouraged
to recognize the importance of their contribution to science and participate
in ways that reflect that status. Discussions about the use of college students (e.g., Greenberg, 1987; Sears, 1986) and more recently Mechanical
Turk workers (e.g., Burhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Cheung, Burns,
Sinclair, & Sliter, 2017; Paolacci & Chandler, 2014) as research participants
frequently cite concerns over the trustworthiness and credibility of these data
sources. Though similar critiques can just as easily be levied against samples
gathered from organizational workers (Landers & Behrend, 2015), the more
fundamental concern is legitimate: the validity of scientific inference is dependent on the quality of the observations and the evidence upon which it is
based. For example, recent research has identified the pervasiveness of careless responding on the part of research participants (Huang, Curran, Keeney,
Poposki, & DeShon, 2012; Meade & Craig, 2012). This lack of attention and
effort can reduce the rigor, precision, and utility of our scientific conclusions
(cf., Huang, Liu, & Bowling, 2015). Consequently, we believe it is important
that research participants are cognizant that their actions can improve—and
hinder—the quality of science. Beyond a role as reliable and honest contributors, research participants can also play an important role in reporting violations of participant rights. One emerging issue concerns the need to inform
participants and for participants to be informed about what will happen with
their data. Transparency is a central tenet of robust science, including data
transparency. Researchers and practitioners have an important responsibility to ensure that appropriate identity and confidentiality safeguards are in
place, but participants may be faced with a new normal where their data
are likely to be available more broadly than they have been in the past, and
thus participants should be encouraged to inquire about the protections and
rights with which they are afforded.
Funders

Although funded research within I-O psychology and the managerial sciences remains much less common than in other fields, there are a number of
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government agencies and nonprofit foundations that support the advancement of scientific research. In the United States, the National Science Foundation, numerous agencies within the Department of Defense, the National
Institutes of Health, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, and the Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation, among others, all contain programs that provide financial resources to promote the accumulation of knowledge by extramural
researchers in topic areas relevant to our discipline. Many industries and
for-profit companies in the private sector also invest in their own internal
research that can contribute to the accumulation of our science’s evidentiary base. In addition to providing critical resources, the research agendas
of many funders are crafted to promote research on topics of fundamental
interest to society and humanity. Given that they represent a key source of
support for establishing the relevance of research, funders can thus exert significant influence on what, how, and why research is conducted within the
broader scientific enterprise.
Consequently, we believe that research funders should institute and enforce policies that promote greater transparency, rigor, and precision when
evaluating and rewarding research proposals. In some respects, funders,
particularly those within the federal sector, are already among the leading
practitioners and endorsers of practices that support open and robust science. For example, a 2013 memorandum released by the United States Office
of Science and Technology Policy directed all federal agencies whose budgets
included at least $100 million to establish research and development plans
to support increased public access to federally funded research (Holdren,
2013). As of 2016, 16 agencies established requirements for researchers to
provide open access to any peer-reviewed publication resulting from funded
research within at least 12 months of publication, and a number of these
institutions have already created or been integrated into designated public
repositories for housing this work. Building off that momentum, many federal funding agencies have also begun instituting infrastructure to support
large-scale data storage and sharing agreements as well (Sheehan, 2016).
These initiatives represent an impressive and positive step in the direction
of fostering robust science. Infrequent participation by I-O psychologists in
seeking research funding has likely contributed to our field being less impacted by these changes. However, as pressure to secure external support
continues to mount in higher education, we suspect these practices will become more commonly followed by researchers in our discipline as well.
Scientific Tool Providers

The process of science is supported by a large marketplace of tools and software to aid researchers in the production and generation of scientific knowledge. The tools most familiar to researchers include those used to perform
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statistical analyses and survey hosting platforms, but there are also a growing
number of products available for data processing, project management, realtime collaboration, storage, and the dissemination of methods, measures,
and data. As these and other technologies are developed and adopted into
the scientific enterprise, they have the potential to significantly impact the
way in which research is conducted and scientific knowledge is accumulated.
Consequently, scientific tool builders can play an important role in shaping
the behaviors and expectations related to robust science.
To this end, we believe that scientific tool builders should pursue product designs in which the “default” behavior of a tool facilitates robust scientific practice. The end users of scientific tools will ultimately determine the
utility of a particular product and its value for facilitating research. However, some ways in which tools are perceived as useful is if they are easy
to use “out of the box,” accomplish their desired tasks accurately and reliably, and allow users to perform tasks essential to high quality research
with less effort. Similarly, the capability to store one’s measures, data, analytic syntax, manuscript documents, and review letters in a secure repository that can be directly accessed across any journal submission portal can
increase the probability of authors, reviewers, and editors promoting more
transparent scientific reporting. The democratization of tools (such as the
move to open access, statistical programs like R or Python) used in research
will also benefit robust science. When more research is conducted on common platforms with identical or similar tools, transparency of methods and
analytic techniques will be enhanced, and these conditions will contribute
to the ease with which findings may be replicated. By no means should this
recommendation be taken as a justification for tempering scientific innovation and the use of novel analytical techniques when and as appropriate.
Rather, we see the use of common tools where possible as an aid (not a
mandate) for promoting transparency, replicability, and rigor that should be
encouraged.
Conclusion

It is difficult to think of many issues more central to the health and identity of
I-O psychology as ensuring the credibility of our science. The defining principles and recommended actions for both proximal and distal stakeholders
that we have proposed represent a call to action for our scientific enterprise
to collectively participate in efforts aimed at enhancing the quality and reliability of the scientific knowledge we produce. Although we have attempted
to take a broad perspective on these matters, we recognize there will be disagreement and differing viewpoints about perceptions of the prevalence of
detrimental research practices, who are the key stakeholders, what and how
changes should be made, or perhaps whether changes are even needed in
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our field. Alternative and countervailing perspectives on the complex topics we have discussed are welcomed and hoped for; it is only through such
debate that actionable consensus can be reached. As alluded to in the opening quotation of this article, though, we hope all will agree that a thriving science requires a culture whose values and behaviors promote trust
from those within the scientific community and beyond. Just as there will
always be room for improving the empirical research and evidence-based
practices we pursue, there will always be avenues for bettering our scientific
enterprise.
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